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I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”), founded in 1995,1 has 
been crucial to the expansion of the world’s economy. States’ markets 
and economies would not be as intertwined today without the WTO’s 
existence. Although scholars can point out its flaws, economists consider 
membership in the WTO, and the liberalization of trade in general, as a 
positive.2 The United States, one of the original members of the WTO,3 
has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the WTO’s efforts to unite the 
global economy. Specifically, American companies and producers have 
 
*  Online Media Editor, Volume 28 of the University of Miami Business Law Review; 
2020 Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Miami School of law; Bachelor of Arts, 
Political Science, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities.   
1  Kathleen Claussen, The Other Trade War, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 3 
(2018).  
2  See id. at 4-5. 
3  See id. at 3. 
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been able to export their goods around the world without the fear of high 
tariffs.4  
However, despite the WTO’s success, the United States is attempting 
to cripple the organization by targeting its dispute resolution system. 
Specifically, the United States is preventing the Appellate Body, the final 
authority of the WTO’s dispute resolution system, from remaining fully 
staffed. The United States is entitled to block appointments of panelists 
to the Appellate Body, and is doing so with each opportunity it gets.5 The 
result of the United States’ obstinance is that the Appellate Body is at 
risk of becoming impotent because term limits cause it to shrink as 
judicial appointments remain vacant. This article argues that the United 
States’ attack on the Appellate Body is a breach of its obligation to the 
WTO and places the future of the global economy in jeopardy. 
 Part I of this comment will provide a general history of the WTO 
and explain its dispute resolution system, which is its largest tool in 
controlling global trade. Part II will explain why the Marrakesh 
Agreement6—and international treaties in general—bind states to 
obligations that they may not legally violate. Part III will outline the 
United States’ attack on the WTO’s dispute resolution system and the 
global response to its behavior. Part IV contemplates what a global 
economy would look like without the WTO, or without the United States 
in the WTO. Finally, Part V analyzes WTO members’ potential recourse 
to prevent the United States from dismantling the WTO’s dispute 
resolution system. 
 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO AND ITS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
SYSTEM 
A. The Origin of the WTO 
The idea to interweave the economies of different states to form a 
united global economy did not originate with the World Trade 
Organization. Prior to 1995, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) had been attempting the same project for decades.7 The 
 
4  See id. 
5  See Simon Lester, Comment to Blocking WTO appointment hurts US goal of 
resolving unfair trade, holds system hostage, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Jun. 22, 2018, 6:38 
AM), https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/trump-block-wto-
appointment-hurts-unfair-trade-case-10449820. 
6  See infra note 41. 
7  See Claussen, supra note 1, at 3.  
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GATT was formed in 1947 in response to the havoc of World War II.8  
As the predecessor to the WTO, the GATT experimented with liberalized 
trade and set the stage for the WTO to thrive. Members of the GATT 
hoped to create an organization called the International Trade 
Organization (“ITO”) to work with the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in furthering global economic goals.9 The GATT was not 
meant to be long-lasting, and states expected the ITO to subsume it in 
due time.10 Ironically, this never occurred because the United States 
(who had pushed for the ITO’s existence) failed to ratify the ITO’s 
charter, which effectively killed it.11   
Even without the ITO, the GATT was integral to setting the stage for 
the WTO. GATT members would routinely get together to discuss tariffs 
and protectionist trade barriers.12 These talks not only helped states begin 
to trade more freely with one another, but also fostered trust and 
confidence among them.13 The average tariff faced by importers in 1947 
was around 40%. Throughout the GATT-era, tariffs steadily declined 
such that today’s importers typically face 5% tariffs.14 The trust and 
confidence that resulted from this economic and political warmth was 
welcomed considering the fact that the GATT was formed directly after 
world powers terrorized each other twice in two world wars within a 
half-century of each other. 
The GATT’s successes were applaudable, but the organization had 
several flaws which enabled the WTO to emerge as its replacement.15 
The largest of its flaws involved its ineffective dispute resolution 
system.16 Because unanimity was required in approving resolutions to 
disputes, the losing party of a dispute was able to block the enforcement 
of a decision against it.17 Among other flawed functions, GATT 
members were ready to form an improved organization to govern their 
 
8  See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN O. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF 
THE GATT 2 (2008); see also Claussen, supra note 1, at 3.  
9  See id. at 98-99. 
10  See Claussen, supra note 1, at 3; From the GATT to the WTO: A Brief Overview, 
GEORGETOWN LAW, https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363556&p=4108235 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2019).  
11  See IRWIN, MAVROIDIS & SYKES, supra note 8, at 122.  
12  See id. at 117-18. 
13  See id. 
14  See id. at 30; Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting Point: Tariff 
Levels Circa 1947 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21782, 2015).  
15  See SARAH LOUISE JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 9 
(2011). 
16  See id. at 8. 
17  Id.  
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trade agreements.18 At the GATT’s final set of talks in the late 20th 
century, known as the Uruguay Rounds, the WTO was created.19  
The WTO, like the GATT before it, attempts to enhance and unite 
the global economy.20  Members of the WTO are equal with one another 
when it comes to trade. This egalitarianism is manifested in the WTO by 
way of the most-favored-nation principle, which holds that states are 
forbidden from treating some nations better than others by giving allies 
more attractive tariffs.21 Although there is an exception for states joining 
in a trade agreement, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”), states generally cannot apply different measures to different 
states’ products.22 Furthermore, WTO members cannot engage in a 
variety of activities that would create unfair trade advantages, including 
subsidizing domestic producers so they can undercut foreign producers.23  
The WTO relies on one key organ to retain credibility among its 
members: the dispute resolution system’s Appellate Body.24 The 
Appellate Body issues rulings like any judicial body in response to 
potential violations of WTO rules .25 It has become a centerpiece of the 
WTO and exists to self-regulate WTO members with consistency and 
coherency.26 However, if the Appellate Body is understaffed to the point 
that it cannot form a panel to hear a dispute, members could simply 
appeal the lower panel’s ruling, aware that the appeal will never be heard 
by the Appellate Body. By doing so, members could effectively violate 
WTO rules without punishment. 
When the Appellate Body is staffed, it improves upon the GATT’s 
dispute resolution system in a few ways. Member states can bring claims 
against violating members and feel confident that a just outcome will 
result. These outcomes come in multiple forms: cessation of the 
prohibited activity, payment of a fine to the victimized member(s), and 
 
18  See id. 
19  See IRWIN, MAVROIDIS & SYKES, supra note 8, at 121. 
20  See Bown & Irwin, supra note 14, at 1 
21  See IRWIN, MAVROIDIS & SYKES, supra note 8, at 38-40. 
22  See id. at 263 (explaining that states engaged in bilateral agreements “grant 
reductions or bindings of its import tariffs of which the other was an important supplier,” 
which are “generalized to third countries either by virtue of most-favored-nation 
obligations or as a matter of policy.”). 
23  See Subsidies and countervailing measures, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
24  See Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The WTO Appellate Body or Judicial Power Unleashed: 
Sketches from the Procedural Side of the Story, 27(4) European Journal of International 
Law (EJIL) (2016) 1076. 
25  See id. 
26  Id. at 1078. 
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retaliatory measures against the offending member.27 First, an offending 
state is asked to stop violating a WTO rule, such as an illegal tariff rate. 
If  it fails to comply, it is asked to pay money to the victim member in 
the amount equal to the damage caused by the violation.28 Finally, after 
continued noncompliance, the WTO allows the victim to issue retaliatory 
measures against the offender to recover its losses.29 An example of this 
final stage was demonstrated by China  and the European Union when 
they placed otherwise illegal tariffs on American products, such as 
Harley-Davidson motorcycles and Kentucky bourbon, after the United 
States placed tariffs on Chinese steel and EU aluminum.30  
Without a robust dispute resolution system, the WTO would have a 
difficult time promoting free trade or enforcing its rules. In fact, it is 
likely that the WTO as a whole would fail if its dispute resolution system 
fails. Unfortunately for the WTO’s proponents, one of its founding 
members, the United States, is attempting to paralyze the Appellate 
Body. Due to this attempted paralysis, the near future looks bleak 
because the Appellate Body requires at least three panelists to operate, 
and terms are expiring.31 
B. The United States’ Role in the Dispute Resolution System 
The Appellate Body is made up of seven judges but only requires a 
minimum of three to function, as only three serve on each panel.32 
Appointments, which are made by the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) 
to the Appellate Body, require consensus among WTO members.33 
Approval of an appointment is inferred; therefore, a member must 
formally object to an appointee if it wishes to veto the appointment.34 
The United States, like any member, has a right to veto appointments to 
 
27  William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 25, (Illinois Public Law 
Research Working Paper No. 03-08, 2003).  
28  See id. 
29  Id. 
30  See id.; Chinese retaliatory tariffs aim to hit Trump in his electoral base, THE 
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/24/tariffs-trump-china-red-
states-retaliation (last updated Jun. 24, 2018).  
31  See Davey, supra note 27, at 14.  
32 Appellate Body Members, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2019). 
33  WTO Members Intensify Debate Over Resolving Appellate Body Impasse, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Jun. 28, 2018), 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-members-intensify-debate-over-
resolving-appellate-body-impasse. 
34  Id. 
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break the consensus. Feeling as though it has been treated unfairly by the 
Appellate Body, the United States has exercised its veto consistently 
since President Donald Trump began his administration in 2017.35 As a 
result, only three panelists remain on the Appellate Body. The move by 
the United States to cripple the Appellate Body has widely been met with 
disapproval; specifically, the chief of the Appellate Body, Chair Ujal 
Sigh Bhatia, has said that the United States is going to “warp [the WTO] 
back to the GATT era” concerning dispute resolution.36 
One of the reasons for opposing the WTO, according to the United 
States, is its unfair treatment of the United States when it is involved in 
trade disputes.37 The Trump Administration has stated that the United 
States is treated unfairly,38 signaling that it believes the United States 
does not prevail in front of the Appellate Body often enough for it to be 
considered a just process.  The United States, however, wins eighty-
seven percent of the claims it brings to the WTO.39 Additionally, its loss 
rate when a claim is brought against it is lower than that of the average 
WTO state.40 Therefore, the United States’ opposition to the WTO does 
not have a basis for a claim of unfair treatment, unless the current 
administration feels that complete American domination is the only fair 
outcome in trade disputes. The United States phenomenal win record in 
trade disputes illustrates its dominant presence in the WTO, which begs 
the question: why would the United States wish to harm the 
organization?  
Simply put, the United States newfound desire to frustrate the 
WTO’s ambition of liberalized trade stems from the current 
administration’s desire for protectionist policies. The WTO’s purpose is 
to remove trade barriers, which is necessarily incompatible with a state’s 
objective of instituting protectionist policies. The WTO’s charter 
explains that the parties to the agreement are “desirous of contributing to 
these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
 
35  Ana Swanson, Trump Cripples W.T.O. as Trade War Rages, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/business/trump-trade-war-
wto.html.  
36  See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, supra 
note 33. 
37  See Swanson, supra note 35. 
38  See id. 
39   Henrietta Reily, By the numbers: Here’s how “badly” the WTO treats the 
U.S., AXIOS (Jul. 07, 2018), https://www.axios.com/by-the-numbers-wtos-
treated-the-united-states-very-badly-1530622593-14ba45da-e0da-462f-974e-
f8792a086177.html. 
40  Id. 
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barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations.”41 These objectives are in opposition of the 
current American administration’s normative view of the American 
economy, and who it should reward. 
 Another possible motivation for paralyzing the Appellate Body 
is to prevent the WTO from forcing the United States to reel back on its 
steel and aluminum tariffs it has imposed on China. The United States 
has used the GATT Article XXI “National Security” exception to impose 
those tariffs, which many consider in violation of WTO rules against 
unfair border measures.42 This exception is “self-judging” however, 
leading to potential for abuse.43 The text of Article XXI is as follows: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
. . .  
(b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any 
action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests  
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from 
which they are derived;  
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment;  
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or  
(c) to prevent any [member country] from taking any 
action in pursuance of its obligations under the United 
 
41  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].  
42  Scott Miller, National Security Exception: When Trade Rules Don’t Apply, 
TRADE VISTAS (Jun. 1, 2017), https://tradevistas.org/national-security-
exception-trade-rules-dont-apply/. 
43  Id. at 3. 
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Nations Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.44 
The exception leaves room for the United States—which believes 
that stunting China’s ability to undercut American steel producers is 
essential to national security—to impose harmful tariffs under the guise 
of national security.45 Therefore, perhaps the United States has sought to 
dismantle the Appellate Body in preparation for claiming this exemption.  
The “National Security” exception within Article XXI provides 
members with almost unchecked power to ignore WTO rules. The only 
check is an eventual Appellate Body ruling. If the Appellate Body is 
unable to function, however, then the power of the member state 
exercising the exemption becomes completely unchecked. 
The United States could argue that it is simply exercising its right as 
a member of the WTO; however, attempting to destroy the organization 
is not permitted under its obligations to the WTO. The founding 
document of the WTO, the Marrakesh Agreement, as well as principles 
of international law provide ammunition for those who oppose the 
United States’ behavior. 
III. THE MARRAKESH AGREEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
The Marrakesh Agreement, signed in Morocco in 1994, serves as the 
charter for the WTO.46 The twenty-three founding members of the GATT 
were the original parties of the Marrakesh Agreement.47 Throughout the 
past decades, from the GATT to the present WTO, WTO membership 
has increased to 128 total members.48 The United States was both a 
founding member of the GATT and a party to the Marrakesh Agreement, 
meaning that it willingly subjected itself to the treaty and all its 
corresponding legal obligations.49  
 
44  Brandon J. Murrill, The “National Security Exception” and the World Trade 
Organization, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 2 (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/LSB10223.pdf. 
45  Todd Tucker, The WTO just blew up Trump’s argument for steel tariffs, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/05/wto-just-blew-up-
trumps-argument-steel-tariffs/.  
46  See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 41. 
47  See Press Release, World Trade Org., Fifteenth Anniversary of the Multilateral 
Trading Sys., 2, 4, (2009), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm. 
48  Id. at 1. 
49  See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 41 (demonstrating that the United States is a 
signatory); See Claussen, supra note 1, at 3 (showing that the United States was a leading 
party in the founding of the GATT). 
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The United States’ zealous advocacy of the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement is evidence of its 
belief that the Marrakesh Agreement has legal obligations. The TRIPS 
Agreement was intensely advocated by the United States because it 
helped protect American companies.50 The United States believed this 
agreement to be binding and instructed other states that they were bound 
by WTO obligations.51 Currently, however, the United States has 
seemingly forgotten its stance on the Marrakesh Agreement’s binding 
authority, as it is breaching its obligation to adhere to the WTO’s dispute 
resolution process.  
The Marrakesh Agreement imposes specific obligations that prohibit 
the United States’ present activity. Article II of the Marrakesh 
Agreement declares that Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (each an “Annex”) are 
integral parts of the Agreement, and are binding on all of the WTO’s 
members.52 Annex 2 outlines binding principles and obligations 
concerning the dispute resolution system.53 Article III of Annex 2 
outlines general principles agreed to by the members as to the purpose of 
the WTO’s dispute resolution system.54 Included in this section is the 
principle that the dispute resolution system’s goal is to find mutually 
beneficial results,55 not domination by one member. Furthermore, 
members agreed to the declaration that the dispute resolution system is 
essential to the WTO’s security and effectiveness.56 Therefore, members 
agree that without the dispute resolution system, the WTO cannot be 
secure or effective. The Annex also obliges that all solutions, including 
arbitration awards, made “under the consultation and dispute settlement 
provisions . . .  shall not . . .  impede the attainment of any objective” of 
agreements made pertaining to the organization, operation, and 
effectiveness of the dispute resolution system.57  
Other provisions in Annex 2 all present clear objectives, including 
timeliness and fairness requirements, which cannot be impeded without 
 
50 See Linda Lourie, US position on TRIPS, in GRAIN 77-83 (Steve Eberhart ed., 1998), 
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2105-us-position-on-trips. 
51  See id. 
52  Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 41, at 155 (Article II is titled “Scope of the 
WTO”). 
53  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
54  Id. art. 3, ¶ 1. 
55  See id. art. 3, ¶ 3-4. 
56  Id. art. 21, ¶ 1. 
57  See id. art. 3, ¶ 5. 
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directly violating the Marrakesh Agreement.58 Article 17 of Annex 2, 
titled “Appellate Review,” outlines numerous objectives. Section 1 states 
the following: 
A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the 
DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel 
cases.  It shall be composed of seven persons, three of 
whom shall serve on any one case.  Persons serving on 
the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation.  Such rotation 
shall be determined in the working procedures of the 
Appellate Body.59 
Despite these objectives, appellate panels cannot be established 
because the United States is blocking their formation, and a rotation 
cannot occur if the Appellate Body has fewer than four members. Thus, 
virtually every objective envisioned by this section is impeded by the 
United States’ behavior. 
 Section 2 of Article 17 discusses how often members of the 
Appellate Body should be appointed.60 The key phrase within this section 
is that “[v]acancies shall be filled as they arise.” 61 The United States’ 
public stonewalling of the filling of vacancies impedes the mandate that 
the vacancies be filled as they arise. The wording of the section, that 
vacancies shall be filled, leaves no room to contend that states have 
discretion about whether the Appellate Body should be fully staffed or 
not.  Despite this directive, the United States has made it no secret that it 
wishes for the vacancies to remain.62   
 Section 5 of Article 17 establishes a general rule that 
proceedings should be resolved within 60 days.63 If the United States 
continues on its path of purposefully depriving the Appellate Body of its 
staff, there will not be an Appellate Body to resolve disputes within 60 
days. Thus, the United States’ behavior likely impedes the timeliness 
objective in Section 5, even if the imposition is indirect.  
Article 17, which contains various Appellate Body procedural 
requirements, is being impeded by the United States. Moreover, 
impeding objectives laid out by the Marrakesh Agreement is a violation 
of a party’s legally binding obligations under that agreement. Therefore, 
the United States is in breach of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
 
58  DSU, supra note 53, art. 3, ¶ 5.  
59  Id.  art. 17, ¶ 1.  
60  Id.  art. 17, ¶ 2.  
61  Id. (emphasis added). 
62  See Swanson, supra note 35. 
63  Id. art. 17, ¶ 5.  
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The Trump Administration treats international treaties as 
nonbinding, so it is likely that the Administration finds a breach of the 
Marrakesh Agreement to be of no legal consequence.64 However, 
centuries of international law and scholarly support demonstrate that this 
is not the case. The head of the American Society of International Law, 
Law Professor Frederic Kirgis, has addressed the question of 
international treaties’ binding authority on the United States, such as the 
Marrakesh Agreement.65 Importantly, academics believe that 
international treaties are treated as binding because of the concept of 
comity, which influences a nation to respect an agreement so other 
nations also respect it.66 Additionally, Kirgis argues that the United 
States has historically considered treaties binding because it has treated 
them like disputes arising under domestic contract law.67  
Support for the United States’ position that treaties are binding is 
also found in the Constitution, which prescribes treaties as “supreme law 
of the land[.]”68 Although supporters of the Trump Administration may 
argue that international law is too murky to consider international treaties 
binding, scholars disagree. Kirgis argues that the United States has 
always held the belief that international treaties should be binding on 
those who sign them: “The United States government has frequently 
demonstrated that it regards treaties (including treaties for U.S. 
constitutional purposes as well as other international agreements) as 
binding instruments under international law.”69 It appears that the Trump 
Administration’s argument is not supported by scholarship or historical 
practice. 
Nevertheless, the Trump Administration will likely continue arguing 
that the United States can breach its international obligations, despite 
historical practice. As a result, other states may try to force the United 
States to respect a treaty it has signed, but their efforts would not likely 
 
64  See David Roberts, The Paris climate agreement is at risk of falling apart in the 
2020s, Vox (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2019/11/5/20947289/paris-climate-agreement-2020s-breakdown-trump 
(demonstrating how the Trump Administration disregards its international obligations of 
other treaties, such as the Paris Climate Accords). 
65  Frederic L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligation, AMERICAN SOC’Y 
INT’L L. (May 14, 1997), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/2/issue/4/treaties-binding-
international-obligation. 
66  Id.  
67  For example, the United States accused France of breach of contract 
following a failure to live up to obligations laid out in the 1946 Air Service 
Agreement. Id.  
68  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  
69  Kirgis, supra note 65 (explaining how the United States historically viewed 
treaties, like domestic contract law, as binding).  
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be successful. If the United States derogates from its international 
obligations with a treaties-mean-nothing attitude, what would come of 
the United States’ place in the world? The United States may soon find 
itself on the outside looking in on the global policy discussion, especially 
as other states’ power increases, such as Brazil.70 Moreover, other states 
may view United States policy towards international treaties as 
contingent upon the election for president every four years. Inevitably, 
states may choose to simply leave the United States out of the global 
policy conversation.  
IV. RESPONSES TO THE UNITED STATES’ BEHAVIOR 
The United States’ belief that the WTO’s dispute resolution system 
needs reform is not unique. At least 18 other members have shared 
similar concerns.71 However, none of those members planned to 
unilaterally halt the Appellate Body’s operations. The United States’ 
attempt at doing so has provoked international condemnation and 
opposition.  
France has cautioned the United States against its current course. 
President Emmanuel Macron has stated that the United States’ trade war 
with China, and broader disrespect of the WTO rules, presents a prospect 
where “everyone loses.”72 Further, he stated that “[t]he strong nation is 
the one following the law,” signaling the French belief that the United 
States is breaking the law by stalling the WTO’s dispute resolution 
system.73 Other French officials have echoed President Macron’s 
statements, warning that unilateral trade actions cannot replace the 
WTO’s multilateral system, and arguing that actions taken for the 
purpose of paralyzing the organization must cease.74 
Germany has also responded to both the United States’ use of the 
national security exception and its eagerness to dismantle the Appellate 
Body. In response to threats made by President Trump concerning the 
 
70  As of January 2019, Brazil’s stock market is performing better than the 
United States’ market. Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil is the Best Stock Market in the 
World Right Now, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2019 12:34 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/08/brazil-is-the-best-stock-
market-in-the-world-right-now/#2d3d672771d5. 
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imposition of steep tariffs on the EU, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated 
that the dispute between the United States and the EU has the hallmarks 
of a trade conflict, and that it is “worth every effort to try to defuse this 
conflict[.]”75 Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel mentioned that it “takes 
two” to prevent a trade war, indicating that the EU cannot avoid a trade 
war without American cooperation.76 Additionally, Chancellor Merkel 
warned that the United States’ attempt to take down the WTO is unwise 
because global problems require multilateral answers.77 Accordingly, she 
warned President Trump that “protectionism is not the proper answer.”78 
Canadian officials strongly back the WTO and resent the United 
States’ behavior.79 Canada proposed changes to the WTO’s dispute 
resolution system in an attempt to discourage protectionist measures like 
those that have been implemented in the United States.80 Canada is a 
strong proponent of the WTO and of multilateral trading systems in 
general.81 For example, in 2014, Canada led the charge in launching 
negotiations that expanded environmental protections in the WTO.82 
Thus, Canada opposes the United States’ goal to inhibit the WTO’s 
efficacy. 
Yet the strongest opposition to the United States’ attempt at 
impeding the Appellate Body has come from India, China, and the 
European Union. In December 2018, these member states united to do 
more than simply state their dissatisfaction with the United States: they 
offered a solution.83 The Marrakesh Agreement did not contemplate an 
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instance where a founding member, or any member for that matter, 
would deliberately attack the organization to which it was bound. As a 
result, no safeguards to this situation were originally put in place. 
However, India, China, and the EU have proposed a response to the 
United States’ actions,84 which seeks to accomplish two key objectives. 
First, the proposal would increase the number of panelists in the 
Appellate Body from seven to nine total panelists and extend their term 
duration by two years.85 Second, outgoing Appellate Body panelists 
would remain in their positions in order to fulfil the panel’s duties until 
their positions have been filled.86 The proposal appears to allow the 
WTO to operate as planned without fear that a member could effectively 
stall operations. In practice, the proposed changes would ensure that the 
Appellate Body could continue operation despite protectionist regimes 
sprouting up in a member’s government. 
Aside from its support for the proposal, India has consistently 
criticized the United States’ behavior. Perhaps India’s strong opposition 
stems from the fact that it has a particular interest in the WTO’s dispute 
resolution system’s vitality: India is a claimant against the United States 
in a dispute over steel tariffs.87 India successfully established a panel to 
hear the claim in December 2018; however, India would require a 
functioning Appellate Body if it wanted to bring an eventual appeal.88 
This fact is not lost on India, and may explain why it vigorously supports 
repairing the Appellate Body. Overall, India has made it clear that it 
disagrees with American tactics and hopes to see the Appellate Body 
recover from its current position. 
China, in addition to its proposal with India and the European Union, 
has publicly admonished the United States.89 Regarding the United 
States’ behavior, a Chinese official stated the following in December 
2018: “A top dog should act like a top dog. It cannot only see a narrow 
spectrum of its own self-interest, and it certainly should not do whatever 
it wishes at the sacrifice of others.”90 This comment was met with 
support from Canada and Japan, who both disapprove of the steel and 
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aluminum tariffs the United States has imposed on China. However, 
China’s comments should be taken with a grain of salt since it has long 
been seen as the United States’ primary challenger for possession of the 
world’s most dominant economy.91 Therefore, China’s opposition to the 
United States’ current disapproval of liberalized trade could simply be 
China trying to seize an opportunity.  
China has taken such opportunities before. In 2016, when the United 
States ceased negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one scholar 
commented that China had been left to “dominate Asia.”92 China took 
the opportunity to fill the void left by the United States, by assuring its 
Asian neighbors that investment and trade should go through Chinese led 
coalitions.93 Perhaps China currently sees a similar opportunity to fill the 
void in the WTO that may be left by the United States.  
Around the world, WTO members consistently disagree with the 
United States’ current tactics. Specifically, traditional allies like France, 
Japan, Germany, and Canada have provided vocal, public opposition to 
the Trump Administration’s actions in international trade. Other 
countries, such as India and China have gone beyond voicing opposition 
to propose changes that would protect the WTO. Whether the 
motivations behind that proposal are genuine or not, the United States’ 
behavior has certainly caused international upheaval.  
V. A GLOBAL ECONOMY WITHOUT THE WTO 
The global economy would look much different if the WTO ceased 
to exist. The benefit of the WTO to the global economy can be seen by 
viewing reports about annual trade performance. Those reports reveal a 
key aspect of the WTO as it concerns global growth; the WTOs goal is to 
increase all global trade rather than just trade involving its largest 
members.94 For example, under the WTO, developing nations have seen 
growth in trade volume across all kinds of products, including 
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agricultural products, oil and mining products, and merchandise.95 At 
least a portion of this growth can likely be attributed to the WTO’s use of 
the most-favored-nation principle, allowing for developing nations to 
participate in the global economy on equal footing.96 
For manufacturers of goods from large states, the WTO offers the 
opportunity to spread their products around the world. Consider the 
WTO’s significant function of regulating border measures, such as 
heightened tariffs. Who pays for tariffs? States do not pay for them. 
Companies do.97 Restricting China from imposing an inconsistent tariff 
on televisions enables foreign manufacturers of televisions to more easily 
enter China’s 1.5-billion-person market.98 Thus, when China is restricted 
from imposing that tariff, foreign manufacturers evade paying the tariff 
rather than the states themselves. For this reason, the presence of the 
WTO is important. Without it, foreign manufacturers and exporters 
would foot the bill for heightened tariffs, which could harm existing 
industries, raise the prices of goods, and stifle trade all together.99  
Open economies grow faster and more steadily than their closed 
counterparts.100 The WTO forces all of its members to have open 
economies. Economies which grow rapidly require new jobs to meet the 
increased output requirements.101 Departing the WTO for protectionist 
policies results in the loss of jobs.102 Prior to the WTO, when the 
international system was dominated by protectionist policies, 
unemployment rates and import rates of goods were linked.103 After the 
WTO emerged, however, imports rose dramatically while unemployment 
dropped or remained steady.104 It can be inferred from this data that open 
trade enables employers from all states to expand and begin exporting all 
over the world. Although imports dramatically increased with the 
introduction of the WTO, each state dramatically increased its exports as 
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well.105 This data demonstrates that high import rates do not lead to high 
unemployment, and that free trade among open economies can lead to 
job growth. A world without the WTO could revert back to an 
environment where manufacturers find it more difficult to profit abroad 
and unemployment rises.106  
Another implication of a world without the WTO is that member 
states would be forced to negotiate independent trade agreements with 
each other. This may prove challenging. For example, only forty-seven 
percent of the United States’ trade is covered by independent free trade 
agreements,107  while the standard WTO rules cover the remaining fifty-
three percent of its trade. For large states like the United States, perhaps 
negotiating independent free trade agreements would not be a significant 
issue because larger states may be able to strongarm smaller states into 
favorable trade agreements. However, smaller states’ negotiation power, 
such as in  Southeast Asia, would not likely be able to produce 
independent trade agreements that offer such states protection equal to 
that currently offered by the WTO. Furthermore, independent free trade 
agreements may not be able to be enforced against large states without 
accountability protections built into international organizations like the 
WTO.  
Alternatively, problems will result if the WTO does not dissolve but 
continues to be denied an effective dispute resolution system. At best, 
WTO members would be expected to follow WTO rules out of honor 
with no real recourse for disputes. For example, the EU has suspicions 
that the current iteration of NAFTA, following the Trump 
Administrations reworking of it, violates WTO rules.108 However, 
assuming the Appellate Body is not repaired, the EU has no real recourse 
to attempt to vindicate its claim against the United States, Canada, or 
Mexico if NAFTA does violate WTO rules. The EU’s only recourse 
would be to impose countermeasures against those states, without an 
official WTO order. Perhaps some do not fear a world where the EU or 
the United States can impose retributive measures for WTO violations. 
However, such a system would open the door to abuse of smaller, poorer 
members by larger members. The WTO expressly sought to prevent this 
from happening. 
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Furthermore, a future in which the United States is not a party to the 
WTO can be imagined. In that potential reality, the loser might be the 
United States if the WTO thrived without its membership. WTO 
members may perceive the United States as an unpredictable trade 
partner, not only because of its behavior when it was a member of the 
WTO, but also because the United States would not have to follow a set 
of international trade rules. The United States’ social and political 
capital, as well as the respect that the United States possesses because of 
its status as a founding member of the international economic system, 
may be lost upon its theoretical departure from the WTO. In fact, 
American business would likely see less growth in a world where the 
United States is not a member of the WTO,109 considering the fact that 
American companies will likely see a reduction in economic growth due 
to the tariffs implemented on Chinese exports.110 Without the WTO, 
tariffs like these could be implemented at the United States’ discretion 
and completely unrestricted by WTO Rules, resulting in stymied 
economic growth. 
The United States believes that it is being treated unfairly by the 
Appellate Body and has attempted to take the whole system hostage as a 
solution. If one of the remaining three Appellate Body panelists departs, 
it would be impossible for the Appellate Body to function. How can 
WTO members stop the United States from successfully destroying the 
Appellate Body? 
VI. RECOURSE FOR WTO MEMBERS 
The Marrakesh Agreement has a section dedicated to a withdrawal 
process for states that choose to remove themselves from the agreement’s 
obligations. The withdrawal process, defined in Article XV, enables a 
party to unilaterally decide to exit the WTO six months after requesting 
to do so.111 Withdrawing from the WTO also extinguishes all legal 
obligations stemming from the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements.112 
The United States, unhappy with the WTO, could exercise its right to 
withdrawal.  
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However, the treaty does not contemplate an instance where a 
member remains in the WTO with the intention of pursuing the 
organization’s demise. As a result, there is no mechanism to vote to 
expel a member state.  
In the absence of a vote to expel the United States, other WTO 
members could involve the United Nations’ International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”). Although this is not necessarily the United Nation’s 
concern, the ICJ’s Statute provides:  
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time 
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the 
Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made 
for the breach of an international obligation.113 
As stated in the statute, the ICJ’s jurisdiction is compulsory upon 
parties who consented to the ICJ statute when a dispute falls under the 
scope of that consent.114 Article 36 of the ICJ Statute states that the ICJ 
has compulsory jurisdiction concerning the interpretation of a treaty or 
determining if a state has breached an international obligation.115  
The United States’ behavior in the WTO poses issues that fall into 
both categories for establishing the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction: 
whether the Marrakesh Agreement allows for the United States’ 
interpretation resulting in deliberate paralysis of the Appellate Body and 
whether the United States is in breach of an international obligation for 
doing so. However, the United States does not accept the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction, so hailing them to court would prove difficult. 
 Even assuming the United States accepts its jurisdiction, the ICJ 
cannot enforce its decision.116 Without enforcement authority, it follows 
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that a potential ICJ declaration would not likely change the United States 
tactics. At best, the ICJ would simply be another voice discouraging the 
United States’ behavior.  
However, there is some utility in getting the ICJ involved, despite a 
lack of enforcement authority. An ICJ ruling against the United States 
may be a catalyst for WTO members to initiate the United States to cease 
its stalling efforts. Currently, the WTO’s limited scope prevents it from 
ruling on the question of whether the United States’ behavior constitutes 
a breach of its obligations. The WTO’s tribunals only determine whether 
its members are abiding by regulations about tariffs, bilateral treaties, or 
other trade related issues.117 An ICJ opinion condemning the United 
States’ behavior as a breach of its international obligations would be the 
first authoritative declaration of its kind.  
 Another possible solution is to appease the United States. 
According to former WTO director-general Pascal Lamy, President 
Trump’s protectionism has offered an opportunity to make reforms to the 
WTO rules.118 Lamy believes that the United States 2018 steel and 
aluminum tariffs violate WTO rules, whereas Chinese subsidies that 
damage American companies are permissible because of the vagueness 
of the current WTO rules.119 Lamy argues that there is a need to change 
WTO rules to account for China’s rapid growth since the last round of 
rule changes.120 A call to change the WTO rules would likely please the 
Trump Administration, and the prospect of the United States’ departure 
from the WTO might spark long overdue amendments to WTO rules.121 
Thus,  the United States’ tactics may spark important change which 
would benefit large members like the United States, which in turn may 
convince the United States to cease its attack on the Appellate Body. 
 Another option for WTO members remains: they can wait. It 
may not be as palatable a route in light of the other options previously 
described but waiting until the United States transitions to an 
administration that is potentially friendlier to free trade may be the best 
solution. Under this option, the WTO could continue to create rules in 
preparation for a rejuvenated Appellate Body. Considering the United 
States’ historical commitment to free trade, as well as the fact that it was 
a founding member of the GATT and the WTO, it is not unfounded to 
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suggest that the next American President would recommit America to the 
WTO.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States reaps benefits from the WTO. However, it seems 
that any advantages the WTO provides to the United States are not 
sufficient to retain its allegiance. The United States’ deliberate attempt to 
render the Appellate Body impotent has caused its allies and rivals to 
voice concern. In turn, the United States’ behavior has diminished its 
credibility on the global stage and cost American exporters large sums of 
money. Ultimately, however, its actions are in violation of a binding 
international agreement.  
If the world hopes to prevent the WTO from becoming ineffective, it 
must step up and convince the United States to alter its course. States 
must not forget the benefit of supranational organizations, such as the 
WTO, which seek to unite the many great nations of this world. The 
devastation caused by the two World Wars serves as a stark reminder of 
the importance of global unity. The WTO promotes that unity. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
